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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to elaborate shared schema change theory in the context of the 
radical restructuring-commercialization of an Australian public infrastructure organization. 
Commercialization of the case organization imposed high individual and collective cognitive 
processing and emotional demands as organizational members sought to develop new shared 
schema. Existing schema change research suggests that radical restructuring renders pre-
existing shared schema irrelevant and triggers new schema development through experiential 
learning (Balogun and Johnson, 2004). Focus groups and semi-structured interviews were 
conducted at four points over a three-year period. The analysis revealed that shared schema 
change occurred in three broad phases; (1) radical restructuring and aftermath, (2) new CEO 
and new change process schema, and (3) large-group meeting and schema change. Key 
findings include: (1) radical structural change does not necessarily trigger new shared schema 
development as indicated in prior research, (2) leadership matters, particularly in framing 
new means-ends schema (3) how change leader interventions are sequenced has an important 
influence on shared schema change (4) the creation of facilitated social processes have an 
important influence on shared schema change. 
 
Keywords: schema change, transformational change, infrastructure organizations, public 
sector 
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Introduction 
Organization and organizational processes are only possible when organizational members 
develop relatively shared schemas, or cognitive frameworks of internal and external 
organizational environments; this is reflected in Weick’s definition of organization as “bodies 
of thought, thought by thinking thinkers” (Weick 1979 p. 41). Shared schemas and thinking 
processes allow organizational members to interpret, explain, evaluate and predict events and 
to coordinate their behavior with that of others (Walsh 1995; Weick 1995, Bartunek 1993, 
Greenwood and Hinings 1988). Over time, schemas tend to become implicit, shared, and 
stable and so are less amenable to testing or change (Fiske and Taylor 1991). However, 
organizational circumstances can change in ways that render preexisting schemas ineffective 
for representing and interpreting new or changing contexts or as guides to taking effective 
action (Bartunek and Moch 1987). 
The issue of how individual and shared schemas change and, in particular what 
change leaders can do to facilitate such change is relatively undeveloped in the empirical 
literature (for exceptions, see Rerup and Feldman 2011, Balogun and Johnson, 2004, 
Feldman, 2004, Labianca, Gray and Brass 2000, Bartunek, 1984). This lack of knowledge of 
how change leaders intervene to effect shared schema change, combined with the generally 
poor outcome assessments of large-scale change (Ferlie, Hartley and Martin 2003, Beer and 
Nohria 2000, Porras and Robertson 1992) and the link between organizational change failure 
and collective failure to change preexisting schemas (Labianca Gray and Brass 2000, Davis 
Maranville and Obloj 1997), suggests that a much better understanding of how shared schema 
change is required. 
The purpose of this study is to elaborate upon shared schema change in the context of 
the commercialization of a public infrastructure organization. The change from a traditional 
public sector organization to a profit-driven infrastructure delivery provider imposes 
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significant individual and collective cognitive processing demands as organizational 
members seek to reconcile two contrasting organizational schemas, their shared implicit and 
pre-existing organizational schema and an emerging organizational schema designed to 
represent their new environment. The former schema is not easily given up (Davis et al. 1997, 
Fiske and Taylor 1991), the latter schema not easily developed (Reger, Gustafson, Demarie 
and Mullane 1994). Nevertheless, to some significant degree, both the giving up of old 
schemas and development of new schemas are required if change is to successful (Bartunek 
and Moch 1987). 
The research from our study contributes to the schema change theory in two main 
ways. First, the study contributes to the literature by presenting a general model of schema 
change (Figure 1) to integrate current research and to guide this and future research. The 
model addresses both top-down sensegiving and bottom-up sensemaking involved in 
organizational schema change (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991). Second, the study highlights the 
complex cognitive processing effort invested by organizational members as they seek to 
reconcile pre-existing and emergent schema, an issue that is not well reflected in the existing 
schema change literature. 
 
Conceptual Context 
The core assumption of schema theory is that individuals construct schemas to represent and 
organize their knowledge of some domain, for example, the purpose of their organization 
(Bartunek 1984) or the structure of their organization (Balogun and Johnson 2004) or how 
decisions are made (Labianca et al. 2000). Schemas consist of relatively stable beliefs and 
values that guide reasoning and action (Thompson and Hunt 1996). Formally, schemas are 
defined as: 
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Generalized cognitive structures or frameworks that people use to impose structure on 
and impart meaning to some particular event or domain (Bartunek 1993, p. 327). 
Schemas are difficult to change, at least in fundamental ways (Epitropaki and Martin 
2004, Davis et al 1997, Bartunek and Reid 1992); they serve important stability and 
uncertainty reduction functions for individuals and collectives (Epitropaki and Martin 2004). 
Evidence suggests that individuals’ beliefs arising from pre-existing schemas can persist in 
spite of contrary evidence (Balogun and Johnson 2004, Fiske and Taylor 1991, Bartunek and 
Moch 1987) and can persist even when change can offer potential benefit, such as employee 
empowerment (Labianca et al. 2000). Nevertheless, schemas can change under some 
circumstances (Rerup and Feldman 2011, Balogun and Johnson 2004, Labianca et al. 2000). 
Adding to our understanding of these circumstances is the focus of this research.  
In the management and organization literature three main theoretical perspectives on 
leader-influenced schema change can be discerned. The first is Bartunek’s (1984) conflict 
model (see also Westenholz 1993; Bartunek and Reid 1992; Poole, Gioia and Gray 1989). 
Bartunek (1984) found that dialectical processes facilitate schema change. Bartunek’s case 
research focused on the members of a religious order who were reflecting upon their core 
purpose. The traditional core purpose was built around education however social justice had 
emerged as an alternative core purpose. Structural change created a context within which the 
groups aligning with either core purpose could engage in inter-schema conflict supported by 
participative group norms. This dialectical process allowed the groups to achieve a successful 
synthesis of the two positions. Bartunek reports that: 
Conflicts between these groups continued over several years. Eventually, some 
members began to realize that education and justice were potentially complementary 
(1984, p. 329). 
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The second is Labianca et al. (2000) Iterative Comparison model. Labianca et al. 
(2000) found, contrary to the conflict model, that schema change (from unilateral decision 
making schema to participative decision making schema) does not necessarily involve inter-
schema conflict. Instead, they found that it was an outcome of an iterative comparison 
process in which organizational members attend to, and process, evidence that either 
confirmed or disaffirm the managers’ commitment to change toward, in their case, 
participative decision making and empowerment. Labianca et al. argue that:  
Our model does not emphasize this conflict between groups championing different 
schemas. We instead emphasize a schema comparison process that occurs at the 
individual level and in the eventual social negotiation of a shared organizational 
schema (2000, p. 251). 
The third is Balogun and Johnson’s (2004) schema obsolescence model. Balogun and 
Johnson (2004) argue that schema change does not necessarily require inter-schema conflict 
or iterative inter-schema comparison. Balogun and Johnson found that middle managers’ 
concept of organization as “hierarchy – common purpose” was replaced by the concept of 
organization as “multidivisional” as a result of change leaders changing the organizational 
situation in ways that rendered the “hierarchy – common purpose” schema obsolete. Under 
these circumstances, schema-based processing is invalidated. Organizational members must 
attend to, and learn from, new information that will lead to the creation of new schema more 
aligned with the new formal organizational arrangements. Balogun and Johnson’s (2004) core 
argument is that: 
(1) when change is imposed, forcing a break from the past, a replacement sequence of 
schema change may be more likely for change recipients than a relocation sequence, 
(2) a replacement sequence affects subsequent schema evolution; schemas evolve 
incrementally from comparison with experience, with no duality and comparison of 
15053 
 
7 
 
old and new (expected) schemas, and (3) the conflict model may be more prevalent 
when there is no channel or mechanism to facilitate the resolution of conflict caused 
by differences in schemas (p. 544). 
Our review of the limited literature on schema change reveals at least three issues that 
warrant further research; (1) there has been limited research on two of the three theoretical 
perspectives, (2) there is an absence of a general organizational schema change model to 
guide research, and this limits investigation, and (3) there has been a focus on small samples 
despite the fact that research has been concerned with organization-wide transformation.  
To advance the research agenda on schema change in organizational contexts, we 
have developed a model of schema change to guide this, and future, research (see Figure 1). 
This model draws upon and extends prior research on schema change (and by implication 
organizational transformation). The model has three main elements; (1) a top-down 
sensegiving element (e.g. Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991), that depicts what change leaders do to 
achieve schema change, (2) a bottom-up sensemaking element (e.g. Maitlis 2005), 
concerning what change recipients do to change the way they construe their organization, and 
(3) the schema change outcomes. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We assume that schema change interventions are triggered when implicit pre-existing 
individual and shared schemas do not adequately represent changed organizational 
circumstances, resulting in an inability to formulate functional responses to the new, changed 
circumstances. From this perspective, the concept of organizational transformation is an 
empirical issue, not a categorical one. This incongruence between pre-existing shared 
schemas and those required to represent changed circumstances constitute a “the perception 
or anticipation of a gap in organization sensemaking processes” which triggers leader 
sensegiving (Maitlis and Lawrence 2007). 
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In these circumstances, the change leader frames an alternative schema (Bartunek 
1993) thought to better represent the changed circumstances, thereby facilitating the 
development of new and more appropriate organizational responses to the changed 
circumstances facing the organization. This represents change leader sensegiving (Maitlis and 
Lawrence 2007; Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991) which is defined as the “process of attempting 
to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred 
redefinition of organizational reality” (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991: 442). The new schema 
will necessarily be incongruent with the implicit pre-existing schema. This incongruence 
creates a fundamental paradox in efforts to transform organizations. New information, 
consistent with the new schema, will inevitably be interpreted through the lens of the implicit 
pre-existing schema with which it is incongruent. 
To successfully bring about schema change, the change leader needs to develop a 
strategy to juxtapose new and pre-existing schema in ways that facilitate (1) individual 
cognitive processing and (2) the social information processing that supports and reinforces 
such individual cognitive processing. Explicitly the change leader’s juxtaposition strategy is 
likely to involve persuasive communication supporting the new schema (Rerup and Feldman 
2011) although simultaneously it must accept the existence and value of the pre-existing 
schema (Bartunek 1993). The communication and sensegiving demands facing change 
leaders in this context are profound and, we would argue, little understood. 
In addition to developing a juxtaposition strategy, change leaders develop a transition 
strategy to support the juxtaposition strategy; they might, for example, change organizational 
structure (Balogun and Johnson 2004) or routines (Rerup and Feldman 2011, Maitlis and 
Lawrence 2007, Feldman 2004; Feldman and Pentland 2003). Transition strategies are likely 
to contribute in two main ways; they create gaps between perceived reality (old schema) and 
imagined reality (new schema) thus triggering cognitive processing and (2) create forums and 
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norms within which social information processing may occur (Bartunek, 1984). Juxtaposition 
and transition strategies are effective to the degree that they facilitate individual and 
collective cognitive processing of information related to the change.  
Individual cognition plays a critical role in shared schema change however it is rarely 
considered (for an exception see Labianca et al. 2000). Change leader juxtaposition and 
transition strategies must trigger individuals to think about the change salient cognitive 
categories. However, even exemplary juxtaposition and transition strategies do not guarantee 
that individuals will initiate the cognitive processing required for schema change. Various 
factors relating to motivation, ability and context may act to inhibit requisite cognitive 
processing (Thompson and Hunt 1996). Lack of activation occurs when organizational 
members reject new information or not recognize how new information can be incorporated 
into existing schemas. 
Social processes play an important role in shared schema change and much of the 
prior research has been devoted to this issue. Discussion (Balogun and Johnson 2004), 
conflict (Bartunek 1984), social negotiation (Labianca et al. 2000), connections (Feldman and 
Rafaeli 2002), communication and trust (Burns and Gomolinska 2001), appropriate norms to 
support these processes (Bartunek and Reid 1992) and the forums within which these 
dynamics can play out have the potential to facilitate the development of new shared 
schemas. Inadequate social processes and appropriate norms may reinforce pre-existing 
shared schemas (Bartunek and Reid 1992). The key issue is that exemplary change leader 
juxtaposition and transition strategies do not necessarily create social processes consistent 
with intended shared schema change.  
In previous research very little attention has been given to how the elements of 
planned shared schema change interrelate. Our model provides a sound basis for 
understanding the dynamics of organizational schema change in the context of the 
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commercialization of a public infrastructure organization. Consequently, we address two key 
research questions: 
1. Is there evidence of shared schema change in response to 
commercialization of the case organization? 
2. What factors explain shared schema change outcomes? 
 
Method 
Consistent with our focus on explaining organizational transformation in terms of 
organizational members’ motives and accounts, an Abductive research strategy is employed 
(Blaikie, 2010). Case research and interpretive methods allow us to understand how 
organizational members construe a major organizational change in context. In particular, our 
methods were selected to allow us to identify (1) the pre-existing organizational schema, (2) 
the constructed new schema, and (3) the reasoning involved in efforts to reconcile pre-
existing and new schemas. 
According to our model of schema change (Figure 1), change leader sensegiving will 
confront organizational members with incongruent schemas; one being reflected in the 
implicit shared schema and one being reflected in the change messages they receive from 
change leaders. This notion has support in the literature: for instance, Isabella (1990 p. 23) 
suggests that people experience change as “double exposures;” and Kelly (1955) suggests 
that individuals construe their environment in terms of a “finite set of bipolar constructs.”  
Consequently themes were framed in terms of double exposures or bipolar constructs. 
These themes indicate what categories were activated by the shift from public to 
commercialized environment, how organizational members represented the bipolar 
constructs, and how they compared and reconciled the competing poles on these constructs. 
Thematic analysis was conducted first by research site then across sites. 
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Case selection 
The case organization, a technically-oriented public infrastructure delivery organization, was 
chosen on three grounds: (1) the organization was undergoing what it referred to as 
transformational change (from traditional public sector organization to commercialized 
profit-driven organization), (2) the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) believed that the research 
outcomes would benefit organizational learning and would contribute to transformational 
change in other organizations, (3) the researchers were given access to all parts of the 
organization. 
Commercialization was designed to shift the traditional operations-driven public 
organization to a profit-driven provider of infrastructure delivery services within a Whole-of 
Government policy environment (Queensland Government 2002a, 2002b). Specifically, the 
organization was to (a) become a commercial profit-driven organization while providing 
Whole-of-Government outcomes, (b) adopt a highly accountable and performance-driven 
organization for the future, and (c) develop a continuous improvement mindset and 
organizational change capability (Queensland Government 2002a). To realize this outcome a 
new core capability was required: 
To change the culture of the place and to move away from that strong technical 
excellence of an engineering culture to a paradigm that runs on …the Project Management 
concept. The core business that we’re in is not engineering, but project management, which 
is the core business of our future (Queensland Government 2002a). 
 
Data collection strategy 
A total of 20 focus group interviews and 22 semi-structured interviews were conducted at 
five research locations geographically dispersed on four occasions over a three-year period. 
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Participants represented all organizational levels and organizational functions, managerial, 
technical-professional and administrative. The mean age of participants in the study was 40.2 
years (range 18 to 64 years). The mean occupational tenure of participants was 13.9 years 
(range 0.01 to 45.1 years). The relatively long average employment tenure of the participants 
indicates that they will be likely to hold relatively shared and stable organizational schemas. 
Three questions were posed (to both focus groups and interviewees) in each of the 
four interview rounds: (1) how has the organization changed since [date of last visit]? (2) 
what messages are you getting about change in [the case organization]? And (3) what sort of 
organization do you expect to see over [the next period]? 
Interviews and focus groups, with the permission of participants, were audio taped. 
The audiotapes were either transcribed verbatim or summarized by key themes. In a selection 
of cases, audiotapes were both transcribed and summarized, in order to allow us to test that 
our summaries accurately captured key themes. Two people were present at all interviews 
and focus groups; one of whom conducted the interviews while the other took notes, 
providing a basis for later discussion of interview themes and issues. Research meetings were 
then held to identify and interpret the themes arising from the interviews and focus groups, as 
reflected in the content of the transcripts, summaries and notes. A member of the case 
organization was present at these research meetings to aid identification and interpretation of 
themes. 
 
Analytical Strategy 
Data were analyzed first by the research site then across research sites. Transcripts and 
summaries from each round were saved in a Word file. The analysis was undertaken in two 
phases; a first-order analysis and a second-order analyses. The first order analysis explored 
organizational members’ accounts to establish their constructions of the changing 
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organization at four points in time. The second-order analysis focused on interpretation of 
first-order concepts in terms of the relationship between change leader interventions and 
observed organizational schema change. The data are presented by data collection round. 
However, given the high degree of consistency in respondents’ accounts in rounds 2 and 3 
(and across the four rounds generally), the data from these collection rounds has been 
amalgamated. 
 
Results 
Our model suggests that these change leader interventions need to produce two broad and 
interrelated outcomes for schema change to occur; interventions need to (1) trigger cognitive 
processing in individuals and (2) create of social contexts that facilitate social information 
processing consistent with new schema. The data suggest that shared schema change emerged 
in three phases; (1) initial structural intervention and its aftermath, (2) new change leader 
process capability intervention and (3) transformation and schema change. 
 
Phase 1: Structural change and its Aftermath 
The radical restructure (commercialization) did, not surprisingly, activate 
organizational members’ concept of their organization and did render prior shared schema, in 
large part, irrelevant (consistent with Balogun and Johnson, 2004). Organizational members 
did need to develop a new shared schema consistent with sensemaking in a commercialized 
environment. However, unlike the Balogun and Johnson case where schema change occurred 
through experiential learning in the context of a pre-existing managerial network, there were 
few mechanisms in our case organization to support shared schema change. 
The effects of trying to operate in a new environment without the means of 
developing new schema were severe and adverse. Specifically, respondents reported that up 
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to three years following commercialization there were high levels of intra- and inter-
organizational conflict, high levels of individual and organizational stress and individualistic, 
rather than collaborative action on the part of business units. Prior research suggests that 
intergroup conflict can facilitate new schema development (Bartunek, 1993; 1984) however 
in this case the stress and conflict tended to be dysfunctional for change and more consistent 
with threat-rigidity effects (restriction of communication and constriction of control) (Staw, 
Sandelands and Sutton, 1981). The widespread and high organizational stress suggests that 
the shared prior schema no longer applies to the situation that confronts them (Lester, 2009; 
Kelly, 1955). 
Respondents themselves attributed part of the problem to a lack of direction, a view 
consistent with the arguments of Reger, Gustafson, Demarie and Mullane (1994); change 
fails because it is “improperly framed by top management,” specifically, change “presented 
as radical departures from the organization’s past fail because the cognitive structures of 
members, whose cooperation is necessary for successful implementation, constrain their 
understanding and support of the new initiatives” (566). The focus on structural change as the 
main transition strategy (see Figure 1) may also have contributed to adverse outcomes. For 
example, McKinley and Scherer (2000) suggest that organizational restructuring leads to a 
gap between the cognitions of top managers and those of their subordinates; top experience 
restructuring as a source of cognitive order, their subordinates experience it as a source of 
“cognitive disorder” (736). 
Nevertheless, some business units did better in generating profit than others. The 
success of these business units was attributed less to capabilities of members of those 
business units and more to the presence of greater local business opportunities. 
From a cognitive perspective commercialization imposes significant information 
processing demands; the representation is not totally internally consistent; organizational 
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members have to represent their organization as both a profit-driven entity and at the same 
time as an entity accountable to government. The demands of profit and accountability to 
government were viewed as contradictory 
However, organizational members were unable to develop a new shared organizational 
schema and salient sub-schema that would have permitted  
In summary, our analysis suggests that from a top-down perspective (1) framing of a 
new schema (Bartunek, 1993) was insufficient to allow organizational members to begin the 
process of new schema development (Reger et al., 1994), (2) the emphasis on structural 
change in isolation of other supportive interventions created more cognitive disorder 
(McKinley and Scherer, 2000), and (3) juxtaposition did render the pre-existing shared 
schema irrelevant (Balogun and Johnson, 2004). From a bottom-up perspective, cognitive 
processing was activated however, collectively, organizational members were unable to 
develop a shared cognitive representation (schema) of a new profit-driven organization 
sufficient to guide behavior in that context and nor were there social contexts, such as 
managerial networks (Balogun and Johnson, 2004) or workshops (Labianca, Gray and Brass, 
2000) or supportive norms (Bartunek, 1993) or collective opportunities for trial and error 
learning (Rerup and Feldman, 2011) to facilitate the development of new shared 
organizational schema. 
The outcome was an organization in crisis. Radical restructuring does not necessarily 
trigger schema change. Possibly if organizational members had been given more time change 
may have occurred. New schema development requires significant cognitive effort and does 
not occur immediately (Thompson and Hunt, 1996). The time required for schema change 
varies in the literature from a period of months (Balogun and Johnson, 2004) to “many years” 
(Bartunek, 1984). However a new phase in shared schema change occurred with the injection 
of a new CEO, an issue taken up in the next section. 
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Phase 2: CEO means-ends (change process) schema 
Two years after the restructure a new CEO was appointed to facilitate transformation of the 
organization. The new CEO was not an engineer (the first non-engineer appointed to this 
position); his background was in public policy and organizational development and change. 
The CEO’s “newness” and “outsider” status provided him with some latitude to inject new 
thinking and practices. Tushman, Newman and Romanelli (1986: 42) found that ‘externally 
recruited executives are more than three times more likely to initiate frame-breaking change 
than existing executive teams. 
In our case study, the CEO introduced a new management philosophy, Three Frames 
management (consistent with framing a new schema – see Figure 1), to facilitate 
organizational transformation. Respondents described the traditional managerial philosophy 
as “hard engineering management” and “I say-you obey.” Hard engineering leadership 
emphasized “doing” to the exclusion of forward and purpose-driven thinking and emphasized 
top – down control to the exclusion of employee participation and engagement, a 
management philosophy unlikely to support organization transformation. 
The CEO’s new philosophy consisted of three frames, Alignment Frame, Relationship 
Frame, and Balanced Scorecard Frame and emphasized forward and purpose-driven thinking, 
participation and engagement and measurement of results. The philosophy was promulgated 
through wall posters, cards for personal wallets, and videos. In formal terms, the Three 
Frames philosophy is a means-ends schema (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). The Three Frames 
thinking provided the means by which organization members could construct a new 
‘Commercial’ organizational schema. In this respect, the CEOs approach differs from that 
reported in prior research. had the new leader did not to tell organizational members what to 
15053 
 
17 
 
think but how to think about the challenges that confronted them (how to develop a new 
frame consistent with.  
Prior schema change research offers different perspectives on the role of leadership. 
For example, Bartunek (1993) leaders forceful communication of an alternative schema and 
holds both traditional and alternative schemas simultaneously to facilitate employee working 
though of inter-schema conflict (Bartunek, 1993). Labianca Gray and Brass (2000) focus on 
the importance of trust (and the adverse consequences of lack of trust) and the importance of 
consistency between leaders’ espoused schema and practice. Balogun and Johnson (2004)  
In our case study, respondents made sense of the CEO’s interventions in terms of four 
double exposures (Isabella, 1990): (1) Engineering focus versus a Strategic focus; (2) Hard 
engineering management versus Three Frames management; (3) Rationality (technical) 
versus ‘Non-rationality’ (interpersonal and inter-group relationships); and (4) ‘old guard’ 
versus new outsider. The acknowledgement of these double exposures does not indicate a 
rejection of the old; it suggests that organizational members became aware that traditional 
shared schemas were deficient in some respect and that elaborating shared organizational 
schemas would be a positive development. 
In summary, Leadership or rather new leadership does play a critical role in 
facilitating shared schema development and this role is not necessarily based on framing 
shared schema content; what was critical here was the new CEO’s ability to frame a means-
ends or process schema that if implemented would allow organizational members to define 
for themselves a new organizational schema consistent with achieving transformation. 
Illustrative data are provided in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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Phase 3: Blue sky meeting and new shared schema development 
A highly significant outcome of the CEO’s means-ends schema was what respondents 
referred to as a ‘blue-sky’ meeting, a social forum within which social information processing 
could occur (Balogun and Johnson 2004; Labianca, Gray and Brass 2000). The meeting 
format encourages innovation and future-oriented thinking unconstrained by current thinking 
and practices (Bunker and Alban, 2006). The object of the meeting, which included 
representatives from business units, internal consultants and external consultants, was to 
frame mission and vision, align structures and procedures and human capabilities and 
motivation to realize this mission and vision. The outcome of the meeting was a change 
management plan; and cognitively a new shared schema. 
Sequencing of implementation of the proposed changes in the plan also proved to be 
highly significant for new schema development. Change leaders explicitly choose not to 
begin change with the implementation of a new structure. Instead, their first intervention was 
the creation of a “project management culture,” a decision which was to have a dramatic 
influence on shared schema development. The project management system provided 
organizational members with a shared language and opportunities to coordinate project 
activities across business units, something that would have been impossible previously. 
Indeed, the project management culture proved to be an alternative attractor around which a 
new shared organizational schema developed (Morgan 1997). 
The work on routines and schema development provides a useful means of explaining 
the influence of project management on schema change (e.g. Rerup and Feldman, 2011). 
Routines reduce cognitive processing load, it provided a means of representing a critical 
organizational task and it reduced uncertainty in that it specified what had to be done and 
why. The project management routine served additional functions; it provided a means and a 
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justification for coordination across business units, a function that was very much 
undeveloped previously. 
The data indicate reveal six “double exposures” (Isabella, 1990). By way of 
illustration the first ‘double exposure’ reflects a view of what drove the traditional 
organization (‘road building’) and this is contrasted with the emerging view of the 
organization as profit-driven project managers. Our focus is on how respondents seek to 
reconcile these incongruent beliefs (see Figure 1).  
We build roads versus We are profit-driven project managers: 
Commercialization was intended to shift respondents’ conception of their organization from 
an infrastructure builder to a manager of profit-generating infrastructure projects, roads 
projects and any other profit-generating project. It is difficult to underrate the significance of 
this transition; project management methodology served as a new attractor (Morgan, 1997) 
around which the new shared Commercial schema was built. The project management 
methodology can also be viewed as a routine; routines have been shown to be instrumental in 
schema change (Rerup and Feldman, 2011). 
Three key mechanisms were generated by the project management methodology. 
First, Project Management facilitated diversification - not just roads projects, various 
infrastructure delivery projects were tendered for. Organizational members became more 
entrepreneurial, more accountable, and more able to build alliances with other service 
providers and greater employee mobility; employees travelled to where work, rather than 
being constrained by district boundaries. Second, Project management sensitized 
organizational members to new meanings. The meaning of concepts changed and highlighted 
the contrast with the much less systematic prior work planning approach, their concept of 
“deadline” changed; project management was viewed as essential to their success as a 
business. Third, PM instilled a common language which resulted in improved lateral 
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coordination and knowledge sharing across business units; enhanced organizational 
flexibility; change leaders became more managerial and less wedded to a professional 
identity based on engineering; contributed to enhanced confidence in their ability to succeed 
in commercial environment. 
Despite the success of PM, there remained a significant concern with perceived loss 
of engineering excellence. The shift to project management was equated with a loss of 
technical/engineering expertise and a pursuit of efficiency was at the expense of engineering 
proficiency. Illustrative data are provided in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
We are public servants versus We operate in a “half-way land” between public 
and private sectors: Commercialization required organizational members to create a profit-
making organization within the context of public sector ownership, leading respondents to 
feel they were operating in a very uncomfortable half-way land (See Table 1). Collectively 
respondents felt ill-prepared with little perceived guidance for operating in this environment 
and reconciling the contradictory demands of profit-making of public sector rules and 
regulations. Respondents raised concerns about how to reconcile providing a proficient 
service (public sector) and an efficient service (private sector and the almighty dollar) 
Corporate; about social responsibility, an important public sector value. Yet despite these 
challenges the Commercial environment provided new rewards; there were opportunities for 
much greater engagement in their new organization than was the case in the Corporate 
environment. 
Round 2/3 provided evidence of shifts in how respondents construed their 
organization. Respondents were more positive. For the first time (after five years) the 
organization made a profit; this had an important impact on morale. Moreover, by Round 4 
there is evidence that respondents were developing an emerging complex public-private 
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synthesis of public and private schemas based on acceptance of the best elements of public 
and private and rejection of the worst; that it is possible to be both socially responsible, 
manage proficiency-efficiency tensions and be competitive. Illustrative data are provided in 
Table 4. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
We make decisions unilaterally on technical criteria versus We include 
stakeholders in decision making and apply multiple criteria: Commercialization and 
project management require Respondents construed organizational relationships in the prior 
and new organizational environments differently. Traditionally, road construction and 
maintenance decisions were made unilaterally on technical criteria with little stakeholder 
involvement. Internally, relationships were characterized as top-down (“I say, you obey”). 
The split with Corporate had a strong adverse influence on the relationship between 
Commercial and Corporate. 
In their commercialized environment, internal and external relationships were critical 
as they were highly dependent on others for access to and delivery of infrastructure projects. 
Externally, Commercial saw itself as successful at building partnerships and alliances with 
local government and with their own competitors. Internally, over the period of the research, 
there was also a profound shift from individualized action or competitive action by business 
units to much greater collaboration, aided in part by the introduction of a standard project 
management system (see Table 1). 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
We operate as decentralized and multiple independent businesses versus We 
operate as a centralized and integrated business, which provides local autonomy: 
Commercialization required fundamental shifts in how respondents understood the 
organization of the business. Traditionally, the organization was viewed as highly 
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decentralized with very limited lateral coordination (an outcome of geographical dispersion 
and limited top management structure). As indicated in the Aftermath section, this design 
proved inadequate for developing an integrated business, indeed the traditional design 
exacerbated competition among business units. As an outcome of the Blue Sky meeting and 
the Change Management Plan, (discussed earlier), respondents saw their emerging structure 
as centralized organization with, paradoxically, significant local autonomy and with 
significant levels of horizontal collaboration, increased flexibility and competitiveness, and 
improved coordination and sharing of knowledge. 
The structural realignment was more the most part considered necessary, in that it 
contributed to opening up lines of communication and encouraged collaboration. However, 
there were also significant tensions in this structural realignment that proved difficult to 
reconcile. Increased centralization led to loss of local perspective and expertise; it also 
resulted in the need for greater workforce mobility and flexibility; they were required to 
travel to where the projects were, with consequent concerns for work-family balance. In 
addition, there were concerns about power-influence relationship between central project 
managers (with little local knowledge) and local work teams (with extensive local 
knowledge). Illustrative data are provided in Table 6. 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Our career opportunities are predictable and controllable versus We have fewer 
career and development opportunities: Traditional public organizations serve as career as 
well as task hierarchies. In the traditional view careers and career progression were somewhat 
predictable and controllable. However, there was a perception that Commercialization 
dramatically reduced career predictability and control. There were fewer career paths and 
career opportunities as the organizational structure flattened and the number of ‘big’ 
infrastructure projects was significantly reduced. Moreover, significant increases in 
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workloads resulted in fewer mentoring and coaching opportunities of younger technical 
professionals; there was a constant threat of downsizing if profit margins are not achieved. 
An issue which particularly irked respondents was a trend toward appointment of external 
over internal appointments; as internal opportunities for development reduced the 
opportunities for more experienced outsiders increased. Consequently there was an emerging 
view that Commercialization was associated with fewer career and development 
opportunities, a significant concern for respondents across all interview rounds. Illustrative 
data are provided in Table 7. 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
We can’t manage change versus Corporate (public sector owner) can’t manage 
change yet we operate on a philosophy of continuous improvement: The radical changes 
involved in Commercialization activated respondents’ change process schema (Balogun and 
Johnson, 2004). There was a strong pre-existing belief that the organization could not manage 
change, a belief that was reinforced by the experience of Commercialization (see Aftermath 
section). Subsequently however respondents differentiated between their own capacity to 
manage change and that of their Corporate owner. Commercial felt it had shifted from “we 
can’t manage change” to “we operate on a “philosophy of continuous improvement.” 
Respondents were very cynical about the traditional organization’s capacity to manage and 
this change process adversely affected their capacity to succeed commercially; there was a 
sense that the public sector partner had any concept of what was required to operate in a 
private and profit-driven business environment. In particular, respondents were still coming 
to terms with commercialization and had little concept of what management was trying to 
achieve or how committed Corporate management was to it. Moreover, respondents reported 
that there were small pockets of resistance at all levels of the organization. Illustrative data 
are provided in Table 8. 
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TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Discussion 
This study focused on efforts to change shared organizational schemas as a core component 
of the successful transition to commercialization of a technically oriented public 
infrastructure organization. Our discussion of the findings draws on our model of schema 
change presented in Figure 1. Our model suggests that change leader interventions need to 
produce two outcomes if shared schema change is to be achieved. First, change leader 
interventions need to activate relevant cognitive categories and encourage cognitive 
processing of change communication. Second and related to the first outcome, change leader 
interventions need to create social environments within which social information processing 
can occur. We consider the findings in terms of three key elements of the model; (1) shared 
schema change outcomes, (2) change leader interventions and (3) individual and social 
factors involved in shared schema change. 
 
Schema Change Outcomes 
Our findings suggest that after 8 years (from Commercial-Corporate split to end of the 
research period) there was evidence of new shared schema development. However, there 
remained unresolved ‘tensions.’ Particularly noteworthy is their effort to reconcile the shift 
from public to public-private (half-way land) schemas, a complex form of schema change 
outcome noted in other research (Clegg et al. 2002, Palmer and Dunford 2002; Denison et al. 
1995, Bailey and Neilsen 1992, Murnighan and Conlon 1991). The reconciliation involved a 
sense of a “socially responsible profit maker.” The ‘public sector schema’ was associated 
with constraints, impeding their capacity to compete yet this schema also represented 
community service values. Their ‘private sector schema’ was associated with a capacity to 
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manage projects efficiently as service to their clients; nevertheless, they felt the focus on the 
“almighty dollar” adversely affected the quality of their work. Consequently, there remained 
significant tensions and contradictions that could not easily be reconciled. 
 
Change Leaders’ Juxtaposition and Transition Strategies 
As discussed in the introduction, change leaders’ sensegiving (Maitlis and Lawrence 2007, 
Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991) plays a significant role in new schema development particularly 
in transformational or second-order change. However, prior literature on change leader role in 
new schema development tends to emphasize different aspects of leadership. Bartunek (1993) 
suggests that change leaders need to forcefully communicate the new schema and then ‘hold’ 
both new and old schemas so inter-groups work through inter-schema conflict. Balogun and 
Johnson focused on the role of middle managers and suggest that in dispersed organizations 
top levels leaders may well be ‘ghosts in the sensemaking process. Labianca, Gray and Brass 
(2000) suggest that leaders build trust and align espoused schema and actual behavior. 
In our research case, the influence of change leaders’ Three Frames management 
philosophy (a new means-ends schema or frame) was instrumental in providing 
organizational members with the means creating a new shared schema that represented their 
commercialized environment. Specifically, the new process philosophy was directly 
instrumental in the decision to design a large-group meeting in which a new commercialized 
organization could be conceptualized. 
The second pivotal intervention was the introduction of the project management 
system (PM) (a component of the CMP). The introduction of the PM occurred before the 
implementation of the new organization structure, sequencing that proved to be particularly 
supportive of sensemaking and change. From organizational members’ perspective, the PM 
system was much more aligned with meeting task requirements than was the organizational 
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structure. It is difficult to underrate the significance of the PM system for this organization. 
The PM system may be viewed as a routine, “a recurring pattern of behavior of multiple 
organizational members involved in performing organizational tasks” (Feldman and Rafaeli 
2002). Routines have been found to enable stability and adaptation (Feldman and Pentland 
2003) and social information processing (Rerup and Feldman 2007, Feldman and Rafaeli 
2002).  
We conclude that leadership matters to shared schema development. Our findings add 
to the literature by first highlighting the importance of process schema for change, not just 
content schema as discussed in prior research (Balogun and Johnson 2004; Labianca Gray 
and Brass 2000). Second, the sequencing of interventions (the transition strategy – Figure 1) 
also has a significant influence; the injection of new organizational routines may serve 
change better than does organizational restructuring. 
 
Individual and Social Information Processing 
As previously noted, our model indicates that schema change outcomes result from change-
salient individual and social information processing which in turn is influenced by change 
leaders’ sensegiving, framing, juxtaposition and transition strategies. We argued that 
sensegiving should enable five key processes; activation, representation, comparison, 
reconciliation and social information processing (See Figure 1). Some prior research suggests 
that lack of activation of the salient prior schema may explain change failure (Davis et al. 
1997). Activation of salient categories was not an issue in this case; the Commercial-
Corporate split created a change imperative. However, for several years, the cognitive 
representation of the new commercial environment proved very difficult for respondents. 
There was little prior experience to draw on, the level of discontinuity between old and new 
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schemas was high and there was a perception that change leaders provided insufficient 
guidance. 
Faced with ineffective prior schemas and deficient new schemas, the level of 
organizational stress was extremely high. The existing literature on schema change tends to 
ignore the information processing load imposed by change of this scale. A better 
understanding of this load and how to better manage it could contribute to the development of 
improved juxtaposition and transition strategies. 
Third, cognitive comparison between pre-existing and emerging schemas proved 
difficult. Much of the prior research on schema change can be located here. For example, 
Bartunek (1984) focused on dialectical processes as the key means of schema change. 
However, in this case both dialectical and teleological processes contributed to schema 
change, and to lack of change. Teleological processes provide a good explanation of those 
changes that were readily embraced by respondents. The evidence suggests that 
organizational members held implicit values of the effective organization. Changes aligned 
with this implicit vision were well accepted particularly those that provided task direction and 
stress reduction. 
Fourth, as we discussed in the schema change outcomes section above, reconciling 
pre-existing and emerging schemas proved difficult. In this case reconciliation occurred over 
several years and was continuing when the research ended, eight years after the initial 
Commercial-Corporate split. The temporal dimension of schema change requires additional 
study (Isabella, 1990). Previous schema change research reports timeframes ranging from 
months (Corley and Gioia 2004), to two years (Balogun and Johnson 2004) to several years 
(Bartunek 1984). The results of this study are more in keeping with those of Bartunek, an 
outcome consistent with the persistence of pre-existing schemas and the difficulty of 
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developing new schemas, particularly in the context of discontinuous change (Reger et al. 
1994). 
Finally, social information processing must support change-salient individual-level 
information processing. The development of forums (Bartunek 1984) and networks (Balogun 
and Johnson 2004) as well as the inter-personal and inter-group information processing 
should facilitate the activation, representation, comparison and reconciliation of competing 
schemas. In our case study, social information processing was highly constrained in the first 
2-3 years of the change; the Commercial-Corporate split intensified change-incongruent 
organizational dynamics. Across the period of the research in this case there were significant 
and positive changes in how social information contributed to shared schema change. 
Prior research underestimates the level of cognitive effort and cognitive processing 
required for changing implicit individual and collective schemas (also see Thompson and 
Hunt 1996) and the high levels of social interaction capabilities required (Maitlis and 
Lawrence 2007, Burns and Gomolinska 2001, Westenholz 1993). Organizational members 
inevitably evaluate change communication in terms of what they know (their pre-existing 
schemas – see Figure 1) and pre-existing schemas are ill-suited to valid interpretation of 
change communication reflecting beliefs and values that are, necessarily, incongruent with 
pre-existing schemas. 
 
Conclusion 
The processes of individual and shared schema change and what change leaders can do to 
facilitate these processes is likely to become increasingly important as organizations face 
situations for which pre-existing implicit shared schemas are ineffective. The study and our 
model of schema change suggest directions for future research. For example, we need to 
know more about the relationship between change leaders’ framing, juxtaposition and 
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transitioning strategies and how these strategies influence organizational members’ schema 
activation, representation, comparison and reconciliation of incongruent schemas. We also 
need to know more about how social information processing associated with better 
reconciliation of incongruent schemas can be managed. 
We acknowledge the limitations of our research, related particularly to the focus on 
qualitative research. Even though we are concerned with qualitative shifts in cognition, a 
mixed method approach could provide further illumination in this case. For example, 
quantitative research would have helped to more accurately scale organizational members’ 
reactions to the change.  
The study has several practical implications for change management. For example, 
change leaders need to ensure they design alternative framing, juxtaposition and transition 
strategies in ways that aid cognitive processing by individuals and groups. Moreover, there is 
a need to design and stimulate social processes that reinforce the embedding of new schema, 
rather than reinforce pre-existing schema. Finally, given the information processing demands 
imposed by change of this scale there is a need to provide individuals with sufficient time to 
represent compare and reconcile implicit pre-existing schemas and alternative schemas. 
In an organizational environment characterized by increased complexity and 
escalating rates of change, the capacity to attain intended schema change will become 
increasingly important. There is significant scope for more research to help develop and 
understanding of the dynamics underpinning this critical capacity. 
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Figure 1  A General Model of Schema Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Illustrative data: the Aftermath: a breakdown of order 
 
 With the transition from public sector operations to competing in a market environment 
tendering for work against contractors, there was initially no real direction given on how to 
get the job done (Focus Group R1-5); no real vision of the future; the future remains very 
much an unknown (Focus Group R1-4). (insufficient framing) 
 The managers … were engineers or people who were at a very high level in their profession 
who were very good at what they did and that was engineering,…. and all of a sudden these 
people were then told you have to manage in a commercial business and had absolutely no 
idea what to do. So some grasped it and some didn’t. I was caught watching the ones who did 
succeed and I was watching the ones who were drowning (Focus Group R1-1). (collectively, 
prior schema rendered irrelevant) 
 Commercialization was fundamentally flawed; pseudo-commercial; still having to serve the 
people of [location name] and trying to act like a hardened contractor (R1-1). (prior schema 
irrelevant) 
 A feeling of being doomed (Focus Group R1-4) and in a half way land (Focus Group R1-1). 
(collective stress) 
 Private contractors could cut corners and compete with lower costs (Focus Group R1-2). We 
are trying to run a business with one hand tied behind our backs (Focus Group R1-4). (prior 
schema irrelevant) 
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 We should go back to Corporate so that we can focus on doing a decent job building roads 
that we know are going to last their design life (Focus Group R1-1). (regression) 
 The Corporate-Commercial split a messy divorce rather than a planned separation (Focus 
Group R1-2) (change process schema inadequate) 
 As a result, there were: Real divisions between the corporate and commercial workforces with 
a ‘them-and-us’ mentality emerging; the sharing of ideas stopped, resources were claimed 
and hidden and working relationships suffered (Focus Group R1-1). (inter-organizational 
conflict) 
 An ‘us-and-them’ mentality [developed] within Commercial itself (Focus Group R1-2). 
(intra-organizational conflict) 
 The existing structure and systems would never allow the group to successfully compete in the 
private sector; no private sector organization would carry the overheads that we do (Focus 
Group R1-4). (prior schema irrelevant) 
 
 
Table 2:  Illustrative data CEO leadership and reframing of management/change 
process 
 Traditional management was hard engineering-leadership and I say – you obey big stick 
leadership style. Quite clearly [CEO] has been the biggest influence for change in this 
department.  I think that Three Frames philosophy as he drove it certainly has got 
departmental support.  He achieved that from being an outsider in a very short period of time 
and I think that’s starting to pay a lot of dividends. (Hard engineering management versus 
Three Frames management) 
 Yeah, I think it’s about, um, different, um, I think when I came it was very much about the 
engineering focus. [CEO] came in; he wasn’t an engineer. He had a strategic focus; he had 
an interest in longer term things, um, and I think it was a change. I guess it was a bit of a 
clash of the engineering culture and the strategic culture: you’ve got the difference between 
planners and engineers; they never work well together, and the strategists and doers 
never...you know, there’s always that merging thing (Focus group) (Engineering focus 
versus Strategic focus) 
 It’s the non-rational things that we weren’t good at before … A long way to go but we’re in 
the right direction. (Technical Professional focus group Round 1) (Technical rationality 
versus Non-rational) 
 Quite clearly [CEO] has been the biggest influence for change in this department.  I think that 
Three Frames philosophy as he drove it certainly has got departmental support.  He achieved 
that from being an outsider in a very short period of time and I think that’s starting to pay a 
lot of dividends. (Old guard versus new outsider) 
 
 
Table 3  Illustrative Data Reflecting ‘road building’ versus ‘profit-driven project 
managers’ double exposure 
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Round 1 
 The Public Service [Corporate] hasn’t changed that much so [when we communicate with 
them] we don’t say a deadline, yeah maybe [they think] we can let it slip until tomorrow, 
sort of thing. You’re always conscious of it – you have a commercial focus and so you do 
try and put in a little bit of effort, extra effort in to get things done on time or to a cost or 
whatever it is that you’re asked (Focus Group R1-5). 
 Quality tends to go out the window when budgetary constraints leave you with little or no 
option but to use cheaper materials and the most cost efficient work practices; everything 
revolves around the dollar (Focus Group R1-1). 
 Being in [Commercial], I think has made us a lot more skilled in different areas like we’re 
doing a lot of things out of the ordinary, now we’re competing for a lot of small jobs like 
schools and car parks, boat ramps. It’s broadened our wings. To do different things and 
compete in the open market (Focus Group R1-5) 
Round 2/3 
 Commercial will become more involved in the rehabilitation and maintenance of the 
network asset rather than in the construction of roads and bridges (Focus Group R3-2). 
Round 4 
 Project management is producing a better-educated management team who are more 
accountable and aware of what the business requires so they can effectively exchange 
information across the organization (Focus Group R4-3) 
 Project management has increased accountability and improved risk management and has 
encouraged people to plan and work a lot smarter (Focus Group R4-3). 
 However, some respondents also felt that more importance should be placed on 
maintaining engineering and technical expertise in the organization (Focus Group R4 -1). 
 
 
Table 4  Illustrative Data Reflecting ‘public service’ versus ‘half-way land’ double 
exposure 
 
Round 1 
 You used to get paid from the neck down, now you have to think as well. Although 
overworked, stressed and under-resourced, working for [Commercial] offers more 
autonomy, challenges, and responsibilities than working for the Corporate side (Focus 
Group R1-3). 
Round 2/3 
 We are well positioned to accept the challenge of privatization. I tend to think that the 
government split us all up so we’re competitive and we’re a lot more goal-orientated and 
we’re a lot more competitive (Focus Group R2-5). 
 Commercial has made a profit for the first time in five years and, consequently, morale has 
improved (Focus Group R3-4). 
Round 4 
 We continue to grapple with a competing agenda of having to win open market tenders 
based on the lowest price, deliver a quality product, while making a [specific] profit and 
operating within an accountability framework that creates excessive overheads (Focus 
Group R4-1). 
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Table 5  Illustrative Data Reflecting ‘exclusion’ versus ‘inclusion’ double exposure 
 
Round 1 
 They are not bashing each other up (Focus Group R1-2). 
In rounds 2 and 3 
 Each has a totally different driving force and focus (Focus Group R2-1). 
 Different sets of urgency exist: Letting go of a lot of the checks and balances to allow 
Commercial to become a streamlined, flexible, hybrid organization that can market its 
products effectively (Focus Group R3-5). 
 Commercialization provides for and requires greater accountability in all areas of 
operation than is required in Corporate (Focus Group R2-1). 
In round 4 
 Create more alliances with Local Governments and build cooperative relationships with 
private contractors and other land use and road network stakeholders to maintain the 
levels of budgets needed to stay in business (Focus Group R3-2). 
 Alliances provided a better chance of winning tenders on bigger projects (Focus Group R3-
3); they encouraged resource sharing, created job opportunities (Focus Group R3-1) and 
provided valuable experience and ... a better perspective of how outside contractors 
operate (Focus Group R3-3). 
 
Table 6:  Illustrative Data Reflecting ‘decentralized/multiple businesses’ versus 
‘centralized/integrated business with local autonomy’ double exposure 
 
Round 1 
 People are making an effort to open up lines of communication and are willing 
to share resources and expertise (Focus Group R1-1). 
 Given the tools, authority, and support by the General Manager to achieve 
business outcomes and make vital business decisions 
 The organization does empower people by allowing more individual autonomy 
and lateral thinking and does foster open external and internal communication 
channels (Focus Group R1-2). 
 There is a continual forming and reforming of teams to accommodate workload 
peaks and troughs (Focus Group R1-5). 
 Specialized people are moving around the region transferring their skills to 
those areas where they are needed. Work is dispersed to where it can be 
handled most efficiently and effectively (Focus Group R1-5). 
 People are told to give things a go or told not to be afraid of the change or 
having to work a bit harder or a bit smarter of something like that because in 
our design area, we kind of get our heads together and say we can do this and 
achieve that (Focus Group R1-5). 
 Public sector accounting is dragging us down from providing a reasonable 
return on investment (Focus Group R1-3). Traditional bureaucratic public 
sector positions with their duties and selection criteria no longer fit this 
organization (Focus Group R1-2). 
Rounds 2 and 3 
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 Learning is now being exchanged more freely and people are being encouraged 
to be innovative in their approach so as to gain the greatest benefits for the 
organization (Focus Group R3.2). 
 Creating conflict among work groups to make the almighty dollar and, thereby, 
splitting us even further apart (Focus Group R2-4).  
 A loss of individual identity and sense of local direction (Focus Group R3-3). 
In round 4 
 Work boundaries have changed and responsibilities have broadened and there 
is a greater focus on State-wide business (Focus Group R4-4). 
 Balancing work and family issues is increasingly difficult (Focus Group R4-1). 
 
 
Table 7  Illustrative Data Reflecting ‘predictable/controllable careers’ versus ‘fewer 
career opportunities’ double exposure 
 
All rounds 
 Fewer opportunities for younger staff to engage in big projects (Focus Group 
R2-1). 
 The workloads are horrendous 
 Although [Commercial] has insufficient resourcing and funding with workloads 
increasing and deals continually with the threat of downsizing in the 
organization, it is in a position where it cannot turn back (Focus Group R2-1). 
 
 
Table 8  Illustrative data reflecting ‘can’t manage change’ versus ‘continuous 
improvement’ 
 
Round 1 
 The core project team, specialized business consultants, organizational change 
management consultants, and a coalition of executive officers have identified 
and evaluated the skills, processes and systems necessary to deliver the core 
components of the project and facilitate the development of new business (Focus 
Group R1-3). 
 It is anyone’s guess where the organization will be in five years time (Focus 
Group R3-1). The future is determined by the political climate of the time (Focus 
Group R3-3). 
 The higher echelons of Corporate regarding their commitment to the concept of 
commercialization. Staff is unsure and concerned about their job security and 
future direction. 
 Management should take on greater responsibility to translate the strategic 
direction of the organization to the workers to cultivate a better understanding 
and sense of stability in employment (Focus Group R3-1). 
 The constant changes to processes and systems; changes that cause confusion 
for managers and staff alike and diminish a sense of achievement (Focus Group 
R1-4) 
 Corporate is slower to react and slower to understand that there are broader 
issues at stake (Focus Group R1-5). 
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Round 2/3 
 People issues continue to be a major problem and are often avoided (Focus 
Group R2-4) 
 Problems are not being addressed or resolved and to obtain some middle 
ground or compromise over issues requires a long drawn out process often not 
resulting in win- win outcomes (Focus Group R2-4).  
 People are not fighting the change but implementation has been very poor and a 
lot more attention needs to be given to the way change initiatives are 
implemented and explained (Focus Group R3-1). 
 There is frustration that local knowledge is not trusted by Head Office and that 
responsibility is not devolved further down the line (Focus Group R3-1). 
Round 4 
 Culture from a builder of roads to a service provider responsive to public’s 
needs (Focus Group R4-2).  
 We can only make assumptions about what the rationale is behind the changes 
and where the organization is heading (Focus Group R4-1). 
 The increasing number of layers within the organization made consultation with 
lower levels more difficult (Focus Group R4-4).  
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